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Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of operating activities and financial and investment 
decisions in the start-up year on post-entry survival.  Using a logit estimation of a funds flow 
model, we compare starters that failed within nine years with those that did not fail.  We find 
that in the first year failed firms typically generate less cash flows, incur higher labour 
expenses, use more trade credit and financial debt, and limit inventories.  Industry 
characteristics also significantly influence the survival probability.  The timing of failure is 
mainly determined by the extent of financial debt and accounts payable in the first year. 
Key words:  funds flow, survival, bankruptcy New Firm Survival 
Introduction 
Newly founded firms have been credited with the creation of a disproportionate share 
of new jobs, innovation, economic flexibility and growth in the economy.!  Because of these 
advantageous effects to the economy, public policy favours business start-ups encouraging 
them by means of grants and subsidies.  On the other hand, the large number of business 
failures each year - especially of young firms2 - and the implied economic and social 
consequences indicate the need to study the post-entry survival of business start-ups.  While 
numerous studies have examined the ability of accounting data to classify failing and non-
failing firms at the moment of failure (or at best a few years before the event), these studies 
typically restrict themselves to mature, established stock-exchange listed firms.  Empirical 
research on the survival process in the post-entry period, on the other hand, has been limited 
partly due to the lack of data on small and medium sized enterprises. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine empirically the influence of the operating 
activities and the financial and investment decisions in the start-up year on post-entry survival. 
In other words, we investigate whether the firm's cash flow generation, investments and 
financing in the start-up manner has an influence on its survival.  We use a funds flow model 
approach for this purpose.  The motivation for choosing this approach above the use of 
accrual-based financial ratios is twofold.  First, most bankruptcy studies built on traditional 
financial ratios typically use brute empiricism to choose financial ratios for their model (Ball 
and Foster (1982)).  According to Gentry et al. (1985), a funds flow based model can 
overcome this shortcoming.  Second, Aziz et al. (1988) suggest that funds flow models may 
allow to detect a bankruptcy earlier as compared to models based on traditional ratios. 
Our sample consists of 823 start-ups in 1985, which we observe through 1994.  Prior 
studies of post-entry survival are based on small datasets.  Laitinen (1992), for example, used New Firm Survival 
40 observations (20 failed with 20 matched non-failed enterprises).  He concludes that it is 
possible to some degree to predict the failure of a newly founded firm already in the first year 
after foundation, but recognises that an important role for future research is to use large 
samples to validate this result.  This study examines a large sample of 823 newly founded 
firms in the Belgian economy, 115 of them failed while 708 survived through 1994. 
Compared to other studies that tend to use matched samples of failed and non-failed firms, our 
data does not suffer from the choice-based sample selection bias that has been attributed to 
most bankruptcy studies where the sample includes too many distressed firms compared to 
their frequency rate in the population (Zmijewski (1984)).  Our study further distinguishes 
itself from prior work by specifically acknowledging the importance of industry-specific 
factors that may contribute to the firm's survival.  The industrial organisation literature has 
documented the influence of industry specific characteristics such as minimum efficient scale, 
concentration and technological regime on post-entry performance (Audretsch (1995), Wagner 
(1994), Winter (1984)). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  The next section presents the 
funds flow model that is used to study the impact of first-year firm specific characteristics. 
Our hypotheses are presented in the third section.  Next, we describe the sample, followed by 
the model estimation results.  The last section concludes the paper. 
Funds Flow Model Development 
There are three main funds flow categories: the operating cash flow, the financing and 
investment funds flows and the funds flows from working capital.  The discriminating power 
of each of these components has been examined in prior studies.3  Casey and Bartczak (1985), 
for example, found that operating cash flow ratios have incremental predictive power over 
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accrual-based ratios as predictors of financial failure although the classification accuracy is 
lower for the first category of ratios.  This smaller classification accuracy can be explained by 
the adjustments to the working capital components, allowing firms to smooth their operating 
cash flow.  Laitinen (1994) found that firms approaching failure seem to keep their 
operational cash flow artificially high by decreasing inventories and accounts receivable and 
by insisting on earlier payments and advances from debtors. Gentry et al. (1985), (1987) found 
that the other elements of working capital are not statistically significant for predicting 
financial failure.  With respect to the investing and financing funds flows, higher capital 
expenditures result in a higher survival probability, ceteris paribus (Aziz et al. (1988), Aziz 
and Lawson (1989), Gentry et al. (1987)).  Moreover, surviving firms are also able to carry 
more debt (Aziz et al. (1988), Aziz and Lawson (1989)) and pay higher dividends (Gentry et 
al. (1985), (1987)). 
The model developed in this study is based on the cash-based funds flow model used 
in Gentry et al. (1987), hereafter referred to as the GNW model.  The GNW model consists of 
twelve components: operations, accounts receivable, inventory, other current assets, accounts 
payable, other current liabilities, financial, fixed coverage expenses, capital expenditures, 
dividends, other asset and liability flows, and the change in cash and marketable securities. 
We expand the GNW model in two major ways. 
First, we decompose the GNW operating cash flow component.  Cash flows from 
operations may influence survival either through the income created through gross margin,4 or 
through the distribution of these funds.  In other words, even if a sufficient level of gross 
margin has been achieved, the distribution of these funds to wages and other expenses can 
lead to financial distress.  While the GNW model incorporates the distribution of funds to the 
owners and debtholders, it does not explicitly model the distribution to personnel.  Our model, 
on the other hand, decomposes the GNW operating cash flow component into three 
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components: gross margin (GMARGIN), labour expenses (LABOUR) and a residual 
component (FOPRES) that includes other operating expenses and income from extra-ordinary 
and non-operating activities. 
The second major change to the GNW model is the decomposition of the financing 
funds flow into two subparts: equity (FEQ) and financial debt (FDEBT).5  In failure prediction 
models based on traditional financial ratios, capital structure has been found to be an 
important determinant of failure (e.g., Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Zavgren (1985)).  While 
typically ignored in funds flow models, we explicitly capture capital structure elements in the 
model. 
Finally, some minor adaptations to the definitions of the funds flow components from 
working capital were needed in order to accommodate the reporting requirements for the 
small and medium sized firms in our sample. 
These changes lead to the following funds flow equation: 
GMARGINt  +  LABOURt  +  FOPRESt +  FCAPt  +  FDEBTt +  FEQt  + 
S(+)  U(-)  U(-)  S(+)  S(+) 
FCEt +  FDIVt  +  FINVt +  FARt  +  FAPt +  FCCt +  FOTHERt  =  0, 
U(-)  U(-)  U(-)  U(-)  S(+)  U(-) 
where GMARGIN = gross margin, LABOUR= labour expenses, FOPRES= residual cash 
flow, FCAP = fixed investments, FDEBT= financial debt, FEQ= equity, FCE = fixed 
coverage expenses, FDIV = dividends, FINV = inventories, FAR = accounts receivable, 
F  AP = accounts payable, FCC = cash and marketable securities, FOTHER = other current 
liabilities and assets.6  Sources (S) are a positive number and uses (U) are a negative number. 
The most likely sign for each funds flow component in the year of start-up is indicated 
underneath each variable.  FOPRESt and FOTHERt contain both cash outflows and inflows. 
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By dividing each funds flow component by the total sources/uses, the share of each 
component in the total funds flows can be determined for each firm and the sum of the total 
net inflows (=sources) always exactly matches the absolute value of the sum of total net 
outflows (=uses).7 
Hypotheses 
The funds flow model will be estimated using a logit methodology.  In this section we 
develop the hypotheses, which are presented in Table 1, that will be tested. 
Operating cash flow variables 
********************** 
insert Table 1 here 
********************** 
It has been argued that liquidity constraints playa major role in business start-ups and 
entrepreneurial survival.  Because of moral hazard and adverse selection problems, capital 
markets provide too little capital to entrepreneurs, who must bear most of the risks inherent in 
their venture (Knight (1921)).  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that entrepreneurs cannot even 
borrow in the credit market to attain their profit-maximising levels of capital.  Hence, it has 
been shown that the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur is much larger for individuals 
with substantial assets (Evans and Leighton (1989), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1994a) (1994b), and Blanchflower and Oswald (1990)), and the likelihood of success 
also increases accordingly.  Additionally, van Praag and van Ophem (1994) found that there 
are few entrepreneurial ability aspects that can compensate for a lack of capital. 
Therefore, firms that are able to generate more operating cash flows in the first year 
should have greater chances of survival: internally generated funds can alleviate capital 
constraints.  Because of information asymmetries, which are larger for business start-ups, 
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internally generated resources are also the cheapest financing source (Myers (1984)).  In 
addition, these firms can prove to external capital providers that they are sound, opening 
alternatives for subsequent external financing.  Hence, firms that generate a higher gross 
operating margin (GMARGIN) should have better survival prospects.  Furthermore, firms that 
generate income from other activities (included in FOPRES) will have an even larger buffer to 
withstand failure.  Finally, firms that can limit their labour expenses (LABOUR) can reserve 
more resources for future investments ceteris paribus, again mitigating liquidity constraints.  8 
Financing and investment funds flows 
Firms that start up with relatively more equity (FEQ) are less vulnerable to repayment 
problems and unfavourable changes in the industry.9  Hence these firms are more likely to 
survive.  Unlike equity, debt implies the obligation of periodic interest payments and capital 
instalments.  These fixed obligations can weigh very high on the new firm, especially if it is 
not able to generate budgeted revenues, causing the ultimate failure of the firm (Laitinen 
(1992)).  Debt obligations can also lead to the postponement of investments which are 
necessary for the long run survival of the firm. 
The payments to the owners and debtholders in the year of start-up are incorporated in 
our model.  While firms that file for bankruptcy tend to pay lower dividends in the year prior 
to bankruptcy (Gentry et al. (1985), (1987)), this hypothesis is not likely to hold for the start-
up year.  We expect that all firms pay low dividends in the start-up year.  However, the 
motivation will be different between the two types of firms.  Sound firms will retain their 
profits for future investments, while illiquid firms do not have sufficient funds to payout 
dividends.  Therefore, we do not expect to find a significant difference for the dividend 
(FDIV) variable. 
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Finally, firms with high fixed coverage expenses (FCE) should have a higher failure 
probability.  If banks can estimate the credit risk of starting firms, lower credit quality should 
be compensated with a higher risk premium and thus interest rate for a given level of debt 
(controlled for by FDEBT).  On the other hand, when a larger part of the funds flows to the 
debtholders, less can be retained for future investments, thereby lowering the survival 
prospects. 
Part of the internal and external provided funds will be invested in tangible and 
intangible assets (FCAP).  For a given proportion of expenses, those firms that invest less are 
expected to have a higher failure probability.  In addition, to the extent that part of these 
investments are firm-specific, they represent a barrier to exit (Cabral 1995). 
Working capital flows 
By the funds flow relation specified above, the investment and financing funds flows 
and the cash flows are directly related to the working capital needed for daily activities. 
Liquidity constrained firms have greater incentives to limit their investments in working 
capital.  Therefore, they restrain inventories (FINV), limit trade credit to customers (FAR) and 
are less able to put aside some cash and marketable securities (FCC).  In addition, liquidity 
constrained firms use trade credit granted (FAP) by their creditors as much as possible.  This 
expensive source is often used by failing firms when alternative credit from financial 
institutions is unavailable (Petersen and Rajan (1997)). 
Control variables 
Next to the funds flow components, two additional variables are introduced into the 
model to control for the effects of size and industry.  First, starting firm size may influence the 
survival probability of the firm.  Most new firms start up at such a small size that they are 
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faced with severe cost disadvantages (Evans (1987), Hall (1987)).  These disadvantages tend 
to be larger when there are considerable scale economies in the industry (Audretsch (1995)). 
Hence, we expect a negative relationship between initial size and the failure probability.  We 
measure size by the logarithm of total assets (LOGSIZE), which has been found to be to be 
highly discriminatory in failure prediction models (e.g. Ohlson (1980)).  GNW use total funds 
flows relative to total assets to measure size.  This latter variable, which captures the rotation 
of financial resources, may measure efficiency rather than size. 
Second, it has been shown that the failure rate is industry-specific.  Industry 
characteristics that influence the success rate include scale economies (Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995)), sunk costs (Caves and Porter (1976)), barriers to entry (Kessides (1986)), 
concentration ratio (Wagner (1994)), profit margins (Weiss (1989)), industry growth 
(Bradburd and Caves (1982)), among others.  In order to keep the estimated multivariate 
model as parsimonious as possible we attempt to control for these industry effects using a 
single variable: the industry exit rate.  The industry exit rate is defined as the number of firms 
exiting in a given calendar year divided by the total number of firms in the industry in the 
prior year.  Dunne et al.  (1988) report that industry exit rates are stable over time.  To avoid 
endogeneity problems, we use the historical exit rate observed in 1985 (EXIT85). 
Data Description 
Sample Description 
We use accounting data in the start-up year for a sample of Belgian companies that 
were founded in 1985.  This sample could be constructed because of the legal requirement 
whereby virtually all firms must file annual financial statements with the Belgian National 
Bank.  The firms in our study were selected on the basis of several criteria.  First, we limited 
8 New Firm Survival 
the start-up dates to the 8-month period March-October 1985.  Given that economic 
conditions are significant determinants of new firm survival (Platt and Platt (1994)), we 
hereby control for business cycle effects.  Next, only firms that reported personnel sometime 
from start-up onwards until their failure or - in case they survived - until 1994 were included. 
Through this restriction we exclude firms that were founded solely for tax incentives. 10 
Financial institutions, insurance companies, exchange brokers and hospitals are subject to 
special accounting rules and are therefore not included in the sample. 
The start-up date is defined by the issuance of a new VAT number.  Exit is determined 
by the moment of suspension of the V  AT number.  Firms that exited through bankruptcy or 
concordat are classified as failed firms.  In Belgium bankruptcy is a matter of illiquidity, not 
of insolvability: the courts can pronounce merchants or business corporations whose 
claimable liabilities exceed their available assets, and who have suspended payments against 
creditors, bankrupt.  Concordat, on the other hand, allows a debtor to avoid bankruptcy and 
the accompanying loss of rights in case the firm was originally viable and the debtor isn't to 
blame for the situation in which he finds himself.  Under concordat, the liquidity problems are 
deemed temporary.  Most concordats in our sample included a renunciation of property for the 
benefit of creditors.  A liquidator then sells the assets and divides the proceeds among 
creditors.  Compared to liquidation in case of bankruptcy, there is no dispossession and the 
completion of bankruptcy proceedings passes off much smoother.  Firms that exited through 
mergers or acquisitions were excluded from the sample. 
The final sample consists of 823 firms.  By December 1994, 115 firms are classified as 
failed, the remaining 708 enterprises are classified as survivors.  Only 14% of the sampled 
starters fail.  This figure is lower than the figures typically reported in the popular press, due 
to the construction of our sample.  Specifically, firms that do not file financial statements and 
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that do not report employment have higher failures rates.  These firms have been eliminated 
from the sample due to lack of data. 
The data include both manufacturing and service industries.  In fact, the 823 firms 
belonged to 126 different industries (categorisation is based on the 3-digit industry NACE-
code).  The five most represented sectors are construction  (41 firms), restaurants (39), food 
retailers (32), business service firms (30) and textile retailers (28). 
Table 2 presents the age distribution of the failed firms.  The number of failures for 
start-ups is highest in the second and third year and decreases afterwards.  However, this 
decrease is not monotone.  Similar age patterns were reported in Audretsch and Mahmood 
(1995) and Troske (1989). 
Explanatory Variables 
********************** 
insert Table 2 here 
********************** 
The explanatory variables of the model were collected for each firm's start  -up year. 
Since the length of the first accounting varied across firms, 11  a correction was made to the 
income statement in order to scale it to a length of one year.  Table 3 reports the mean, median 
and standard error for each funds flow component and control variable for the subsamples of 
failed and surviving firms.  The last column reports the nonparametric ¥suskal-Wallis test 
statistic for differences between the two groups. 
********************** 
insert Table 3 here 
********************** 
For most of the variables - except for FCE, FDIV, FOPRES and FCC - the standard 
deviation is larger in the group of failed firms, a result which had already been found in the 
first study by Beaver (1966).  The means of both groups have the same sign and their sign 
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corresponds to the expected signs for sources (+) and uses (-), as expressed in equation (1). 
Prior studies have found that failed firms tend to exhibit, on average, different behaviour in 
the year prior to failure.  For example, Gentry et al. (1987) found that prior to failure, firms 
tend to disinvest in working capital.  Our findings, as expected, indicate that this difference 
between failed and non-failed firms is less apparent in the year of start-up.  The results of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that only the proportional funds from gross margin, accounts 
payable and liquid assets are significantly different at the 5% level between the failed and 
non-failed firms.  At the 10% level, the industry exit rate is different for failed firms.  For 
these variables that are significantly different between the failed and non-failed group, the 
signs of the differences correspond to the hypotheses set forth in Table 1.  Firms that fail 
within the first 9 years generate less gross margin and fund their operations more with 
accounts payable in their first year of operation.  They also have less liquid assets at their 
disposal.  As expected, failed firms operate in industries that have higher exit rates. 
Multivariate Analysis 
We use a multivariate logit model to determine which variables are significant in 
determining the survival for starting firms.  The multivariate logistic regression explicitly 
allows for interrelationships among variables.  The estimated coefficients and asymptotic p-
values are presented in Table 4.  Model A examines the impact of the explanatory variables on 
the probability of failure whereas model B examines the impact of the explanatory variables 
on the probability of early relative to late failure.  To avoid overidentification in the estimation 
procedure, we omit the FaTHER component from the funds flow model.  We discuss each 
model in turn. 
11 ********************** 
insert Table 4 here 
********************** 
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The results of model A show that, except for FeE (which is not statistically 
significant), all coefficients have the expected sign.  Firms with a high gross operating margin 
relative to their total sources (GMARGIN) in the year of start-up have significantly higher 
probability of survival.  The operating margin lies at the heart of the business and forms the 
basis to remunerate all deployed resources.  Therefore, it is necessary to generate a minimum 
value added in the long run, ceteris paribus.  Income generated beyond the normal business 
activities (FOPRES) is also a significant determinant of survival.  Failed firms not only 
generate less operating margin, they also have significantly higher labour expenses (for a 
given capital intensity). 
The second category of funds flow variables represents the firm's financing sources. 
The proportion of funds obtained from equity (FEQ) in the start-up year does not significantly 
impact the failure probability of the firm.  However, as expected, failed firms obtain a 
significantly higher proportion of their funds from financial (bank) debt (FDEBT).  Recall 
that, for a given level of financial debt, failed firms pay similar interest expenses and use other 
more expensive sources of financing such as accounts payable more extensively.  Overall, 
these results are consistent with the findings reported by Laitinen (1992) who found that failed 
newly founded firms have difficulty in generating cash flows, which leads them to use more 
outside financing in the first few years. 
Their distribution to debtholders (FeE) and equity holders (FDIV) is not significantly 
higher.  In other words, for a given level of debt, failed firms did not incur higher debt 
servicing costs than the non-failed firms.  Given that very few firms pay dividends in the first 
year (only 31 out of 823), this coefficient was not expected to be significant.  Lastly, the 
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proportion of funds allocated to fixed investments (FCAP) in the first year does not influence 
post-entry survival. 
Finally, a firm's use of working capital may also contribute to its success.  The results 
indicate that in the start-up year failed firms significantly use trade credit granted by their 
creditors (FAP) more extensively and invest less of their funds in inventories (FINV).  Thus, 
firms that are not forced to use expensive trade credit nor to control their inventory levels have 
a higher survival probability.  These results suggest that failed firms compensate their 
shortage of start  -up capital by controlling their working capital.  The liquidity problems are 
further illustrated by their significantly lower proportion of funds invested in cash (FCC) in 
the start-up year.  Hence, firms that are able to keep a larger safety margin by holding a 
portion of their funds in cash to payoff due debt andlor other obligations face a higher 
survi val probability. 
Failed firms do not grant significantly less trade credit to customers (FAR).  The 
reason may be that starting firms have not yet built up a reputation that enables them to 
deviate from industry standards.  Therefore, liquidity constrained starting firms may not be 
able to impose stricter restrictions than the average credit limits of the industry.  12 
With respect to the control variables we find, surprisingly, that firm size does not have 
a significant impact.  Ceteris paribus, the probability of new firm failure is significantly higher 
in highly turbulent industries.  In other words, while firm-specific characteristics playa 
significant role, exogenous industry characteristics also contribute to the survival prospects. 
This finding indicates that industry characteristics should be taken into account in failure 
prediction models. 
Overall, the conclusions from the results reported for Model A are that failed new 
firms typically have difficulty generating cash flows in the first year, and at the same time 
have to payout more of their funds as labour expenses.  To compensate for this liquidity 
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problem they use trade credit granted by creditors more extensively and limit tying up funds in 
inventories.  Despite that they obtain more of their funds from financial debt compared to non-
failed firms, the former do not incur a higher proportion of interest expenses.  These results 
are obtained after controlling for industry-specific factors. 
Using model A with data on the start-up year, the logit technique correctly identified 
55.7% of the failed and 76.1 % of the survivors, with an overall classification accuracy of 
73.2%.  Not surprisingly, our model's classification accuracy is lower than models that predict 
failure using information close to the time of failure.  For example, the GNW model correctly 
predicts 79% of failures and 88% of the non-failures based on information taken one year 
before failure.  In contrast, our study uses information available at the start-up, which is one to 
nine years before failure. Moreover, other studies of new firms generally report results more 
comparable to ours.  The multivariate models in Laitinen (1992), for example, correctly 
predict 70% of the failures and 75% of the non-failures in the year after foundation. 
Furthermore, he shows that the predictive accuracy increases as the date of failure approaches. 
While the predictive accuracy of our model is low,13 it is not without merit.  Specifically, over 
% of the survivors were classified correctly.  In other words, our model is more useful in 
classifying survivors than failures.  This is also useful information to financial institutions that 
grant loans to starting firms. 
Model B examines the impact of the explanatory variables on the timing of failure. 
For all the firms that were classified as failed, we investigate whether the funds flows in the 
first year influence the duration of the firm.  Based on the distribution of age across failed 
firms reported in Table 2, we classified early failure as occurring within 4 years, which is 
when the annual number of failures was highest, and late failures occurring after 5 years.  14 
This model does not include the FDIV variable: given that none of the late failed and only 4 of 
the early failed paid dividends, the inclusion of this variable resulted in estimation problems. 
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The results indicate that, for those firms failing within the first 9 years, the timing of failure is 
significantly affected by several factors.  Firms that fail early obtain a significantly higher 
proportion of their funds from accounts payable (FAP) and financial debt (FDEBT), and are 
also significantly smaller (LOGSIZE).  Hence, failure is expedited when firms are burdened 
with expensive sources of financing.  Laitinen (1994) also found that accounts payable are 
increased in the last phase of the failure process.  In addition, firms that fail early are 
significantly smaller (LOGSIZE).  This result is consistent with other studies that have found 
size to be a significant determinant of failure (Hall (1987), Evans (1987)).  Our results further 
show that while gross margin, extra-ordinary income, labour expenses, investments in 
inventories and liquid assets and the industry exit rate significantly affect the probability of 
failure, they do not have an impact on the timing of the failure. 
The results of model A and B are consistent with the failure process described by 
Laitinen (1992).  He stresses that it is the unexpected insufficiency of revenue financing that 
causes the beginning of the failure process.  As the firm is not able to generate the planned 
amount of revenues, it is forced to take more and more debt to survive.  Thereafter the firm 
must budget for more and more revenues to pay its increased financial obligations, a vicious 
circle that may finally end in failure.  Indeed when comparing model A and B, we see that 
both early and late failing firms have problems in generating sufficient cash flows.  However, 
during the first year of start-up, firms that fail early have already appealed more to external 
debt, i.e. financial debt as well as trade credit. 
15 New Firm Survival 
Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to examine whether publicly available information 
about the sources and uses of funds in the first year of operation is indicative of the firm's 
survival prospects.  Using a logit estimation of an extended funds flow model on a sample of 
823 new firm start-ups over an eight-month period we found some significant differences in 
the start-up year between those firms that failed within nine years and those that did not. 
Specifically, failed new firms typically have difficulty generating cash flows in the first year, 
and at the same time are faced with higher labour expenses.  To compensate for this liquidity 
problem they use trade credit granted by creditors more extensively and limit inventories. 
Despite that they obtain more of their funds from financial debt compared to non-failed firms, 
the former do not incur a higher proportion of interest expenses.  Another important 
determinant of failure is the industry in which the firm operates. 
We also examined which firm-specific factors observed in the first year affect the 
timing of failure.  Our results indicate that failure occurs sooner for smaller firms and when 
the first year of operations is funded more extensively with trade credit and financial debt. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses for the funds flow components and control variables 
Variable (Source +/ Use-) 
Cash flow variables 
GMARGIN (gross operating margin) (+) 
LABOUR (labour expenses) (-) 
FOPRES (other operating results) (+/-) 
Financing and investment funds flows 
FEQ (Equity financing) (+) 
FDEBT (Financial debt) (+) 
FDIV (dividends) (-) 
FCE (interest paid on leases and debt) (-) 
FCAP (investment funds flows) (-) 
Working capital variables 
FINV (Inventory) (-) 
FAR (Accounts receivable) (-) 
FAP (Accounts payable) (+) 
FCC (Cash and other marketable securities) (-) 
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Table 2: Age distribution of the failed firms 
Year  Total number offailures  Percentage of  total failures  Probability of  failure 
conditional on survival 
1986  2  1.74%  0.0024 
1987  29  25.22%  0.0366 
1988  27  23.48%  0.0353 
1989  19  16.52%  0.0255 
1990  4  3.48%  0.0054 
1991  10  8.70%  0.0137 
1992  5  4.35%  0.0069 
1993  6  5.22%  0.0083 
1994  13  11.30%  0.0184 
18 New Firm Survival 
Table 3: Data description for failed and non-failed firms 
Failed firms 
mean  median  std. error 
GMARGIN (S)  0.2634  0.2714  0.3035 
LABOUR(U)  -0.2447  -0.2112  0.1987 
FOPRES (S/U)  -0.0287  -0.0039  0.1344 
FEQ (S)  0.1519  0.1021  0.1823 
FDEBT (S)  0.1824  0.0917  0.2077 
FDIV (U)  -0.0013  0  0.0090 
FCE (U)  -0.0158  -0.0098  0.0185 
FCAP CU)  -0.2909  -0.2661  0.2416 
PINV (U)  -0.1133  -0.0381  0.1674 
FAR CU)  -0.1567  -0.1124  0.1843 
FAP (S)  0.2246  0.1699  0.2091 
FCC (U)  -0.0516  -0.0246  0.0677 
FOTHER(S/u)  0.0809  0.0503  0.1999 
LOGSIZE  8.3712  8.3775  1.5808 
EXIT85  0.1814  0.1450  0.1733 
(S)  =  source,  (U) =  use of funds 
** significant at the 95% confidence level 
* significant at the 90% confidence level 
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Soundfirms 
mean  median  std. error  Wilcoxon 
0.3712  0.3613  0.2404  0.0002** 
-0.2388  -0.2001  0.1793  0.9498 
-0.0235  -0.0085  0.1511  0.2215 
0.1365  0.0986  0.1523  0.9582 
0.1513  0.0826  0.1847  0.1710 
-0.0017  0  0.0114  0.8591 
-0.017  -0.0087  0.0224  0.6554 
-0.3241  -0.2749  0.2396  0.1107 
-0.1142  -0.0442  0.1511  0.6978 
-0.1472  -0.1018  0.1652  0.9934 
0.1764  0.1118  0.1890  0.0121** 
-0.0780  -0.0521  0.0815  0.0001 ** 
0.1091  0.0732  0.1833  0.2597 
8.5943  8.4983  1.2342  0.4293 
0.1599  0.1125  0.1408  0.0656* New Firm Survival 
Table 4: Multivariate logit estimates 
Mode/A:  ModelB: 
probability offailure  Probability of  early vs.  late failure 
115 failed firms  77 early failed firms 
708 non-failed fimls  38 late failed firms 
estimated  p-value  estimated  p-value 
coefficient  coefficient 
INTERCEPT  -0.5520  0.6290  6.7400  0.0208** 
GMARGIN  -4.5435  0.0001 **  -2.7704  0.1748 
LABOUR  -3.8391  0.0057**  -3.6325  0.2787 
FOPRES  -4.2250  0.0007**  0.4008  0.8792 
FEQ  -0.3043  0.7434  -1.1688  0.5953 
FDEBT  1.3535  0.0948*  4.3921  0.0517* 
FDIV  -0.7194  0.9451 
FCE  9.0392  0.1844  28.7328  0.1166 
FCAP  1.2290  0.1976  2.5268  0.2613 
FINV  1.9961  0.0741 *  3.7770  0.1442 
FAR  1.1533  0.2893  1.0050  0.7069 
FAP  1.4373  0.0743*  5.1501  0.0208** 
FCC  5.1054  0.0085**  1.4997  0.7298 
LOGSIZE  -0.0300  0.7607  -0.5985  0.0152** 
EXIT85  1.3690  0.0396**  -3.7402  0.1355 
** significant at the 95% confidence level 
* significant at the 90% confidence level 
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Footnotes 
1 See e.g., Birch (1979), Armington and OdIe (1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1982) and Swain 
(1985). 
2 See e.g., Acs and Audretsch (1993), Audretsch (1991), Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) and 
Mata and Portugal (1994). 
3 Casey and Bartczak (1985) and Laitinen (1994) include working capital components in their 
definition of operational cash flow. 
4 Gross operating margin results from the difference between operating revenues and the costs 
of goods and services delivered by third parties.  It  reflects whether the firm adds value to 
purchased goods and services. 
5 In the accounting practices followed the borderline between short term and long term debt is 
made at one year, so we were unable to study the impact of short term versus long term 
financial debt on the probability of failure. 
6 A detailed description of the different funds flow components based on the Belgian annual 
accounts is available from the corresponding author. 
7 One could argue that the total funds flow is rather unstable, so that it would be better to 
divide each funds flow component by total assets rather than by total funds.  However, in the 
first year, total assets and total funds flow are highly correlated (correlation =  0.91). 
8 This hypothesis does not imply that failure rates are higher in labour intensive firms.  Capital 
intensity is controlled by for the variable FCAP. 
9 For example, Opler and Titman (1994) found that the market value of equity of highly 
leveraged firms drops significantly more than that of low levered firms once the industry is 
confronted with a downturn. 
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10 Other restrictions were imposed on the sample firms.  Firms that invested over half of their 
funds in liquid assets were also excluded from the sample since it is likely that their 
operations did not start until the second year.  Likewise, firms without operational activities 
during their first accounting year, i.e. without reported sales or labour remuneration, were 
excluded.  Firms that had corporate owners within two years of start-up were also excluded as 
these firms were likely to be spin-offs.  Lastly, firms with financial statements which 
contained errors for the first accounting year were also deleted from our database.  Overall, 
the number of firms with errors in their financial accounts is small (66 firms of which 7 failed 
and 57 survived) compared to the total sample size.  Discarding firms with reporting errors 
did not materially affect the default rates of the sample. 
11  The median length of the first accounting year is 447 days.  The results of our study did not 
change when firms with a very short or very long first accounting year were eliminated from 
the data. 
12 While it can be argued that accounts receivable could be sold to a financial institution, this 
technique is hardly used by Belgian enterprises (Donckels et al. (1987)). 
13  As discussed in Laitinen (1992), small and starting business failures have been attributed to 
non-quantifiable data, such as management competency, that is not reported in financial 
statements. 
14 Changing the definition of early vs. late by one or two years did not change the results of 
Model B.  Results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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